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NOT YET GONE, AND NOT YET 
FORGOTTEN: THE REASONABLENESS OF 
CONTINUED MANDATORY DETENTION OF 
NONCITIZENS WITHOUT A BOND 
HEARING 
MIRIAM PEGUERO MEDRANO* 
 
Section 1226(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act (IIRIRA) authorizes the mandatory detention, without the 
possibility of bond, of noncitizens convicted of certain qualifying offenses for 
the duration of their removal proceedings.  Congress enacted the mandatory 
detention statute because it was concerned that noncitizens who are con-
victed of crimes will further engage in criminal activity and fail to appear for 
their removal hearings.  To ensure noncitizens are not deprived of their con-
stitutional right to due process, federal courts have construed § 1226(c) to 
contain an implicit time limitation against unreasonably prolonged deten-
tion.  These courts have adopted either a bright-line or case-by-case ap-
proach to determine the point at which mandatory detention without bond 
becomes unconstitutionally impermissible.  After six months of detention, the 
former requires an automatic bond hearing and the latter instructs detainees 
to file a habeas corpus petition that, if granted, triggers a bond hearing.  
This year, the Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez rejected the 
lower courts’ construction § 1226(c) and held that interpreting § 1226(c) to 
contain an implicit time limitation is improper because the statute is neither 
ambiguous or unclear.  The Court, however, declined to consider whether its 
interpretation of § 1226(c) is constitutional and instead remanded the case 
back to the Ninth Circuit to consider constitutional arguments on the merits.  
 
* B.A., Monmouth University, 2013; J.D. candidate, Northwestern University Pritzker School 
of Law, 2018. This Comment is dedicated to all immigrants, like my family and me, who have 
come to America for the opportunity of a better life—the American Dream. I would like to 
also thank my family and friends for their endless support and encouragement of my Dream 
to pursue a law degree, and all the editors of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
for their hard work and dedication in editing this piece. 
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This Comment argues that the majority’s decision in Jennings v. Rodri-
guez failed to enforce the Constitution and protect the due process rights of 
detained noncitizens by interpreting § 1226(c) as not having a time limit on 
detention without bond.  It further contends that while the lower courts cor-
rectly interpreted § 1226(c) to include a time limit, the current approaches 
applied by these courts do not properly protect detainees’ constitutional 
rights because under both approaches, detainees cannot challenge the rea-
sonableness of their continued detention until after six months.  Limiting de-
tainees’ opportunity to challenge their continued detention for six months 
raises the same “serious doubts” of constitutionality that Justice Breyer ar-
gued, in dissent, are raised when § 1226(c) is interpreted as forbidding an 
individualized bond hearing.  Alternatively, this Comment proposes that de-
tained noncitizens—who pose little risk of flight or danger to the commu-
nity—should receive prosecutorial discretion in the form of deferred action 
as to their continued detention at any point during their detention, including 
during the “presumptively reasonable” six-month period under the current 
two approaches.  If prosecutorial discretion is not granted, detained noncit-
izens should then be entitled to automatic and periodic bond hearings begin-
ning at six months of detention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I like to share the story of Mr. Warren Hilarion Joseph. Mr. Joseph mi-
grated to the United States when he was twenty-one as a legal permanent 
resident inspired by the American Dream.1 Today, Mr. Joseph is a U.S. citi-
zen, a U.S. Gulf War veteran, a father to U.S.-born children, and a former 
legal permanent resident who was detained for three and a half years in im-
migration detention for committing minor, nonviolent offenses.2  
Shortly after arriving in the United States at the age of twenty-one, Mr. 
Joseph enlisted in the U.S. Army and served in combat positions in the First 
Gulf War until he was honorably discharged for injuries suffered in the line 
 
1  See Brief for Americans for Immigrant Justice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents at 5–7, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) [hereinafter Brief for Amer-
icans for Immigrant Justice et al.] 
2  Mr. Joseph’s story is among the many made available by the Prolonged Detention Sto-
ries online platform, a joint project of Community Initiatives for Visiting Immigrants in Con-
finement (CIVIC) and the Immigrant Rights Clinic at NYU Law.  In an effort to underscore 
the devastating impact of prolonged mandatory detention, CIVIC and NYU Law created this 
platform for immigrants to share their stories.  Some of these stories were included in an ami-
cus brief in support of Respondents in the case Jennings v. Rodriguez.  See The Brief, 
PROLONGED DETENTION STORIES, https://www.prolongeddetentionstories.org/#the-brief (last 
visited Dec. 25, 2017). The facts of Mr. Joseph’s case are also detailed in his habeas petition, 
see Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Joseph v. Aviles, No. 2:07-cv-02392-JLL (D.N.J. May 
11, 2007).  
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of duty.3  Like many veterans, Mr. Joseph had a hard time readjusting to so-
ciety and was arrested in 2001 for illegally purchasing a handgun for people 
to whom he owed money.4  While completing his probation sentence, he for-
got to inform his probation officer that he had relocated to his mother’s house 
and was subsequently sentenced to six months in prison for violating his pro-
bation.5   
Upon release, Mr. Joseph was civilly detained in immigration detention 
because he qualified as a noncitizen who committed an offense that triggers 
the mandatory detention mandate under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) of the Illegal Im-
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).6  
Section 1226(c) mandates the detention without bond of noncitizens who 
have committed qualifying crimes for the duration of their removal proceed-
ings.7  
For three and a half years, Mr. Joseph was separated from his children 
and family members, was subjected to horrific jail conditions, and his war-
time injuries worsened, requiring surgery and causing permanent difficulty 
walking.8  At no point during Mr. Joseph’s mandatory detention was his con-
finement necessary to prevent flight or danger to the community.  To the 
contrary, Mr. Joseph had strong familial and community values and had 
served in the U.S. military.  His two crimes were both minor and non-violent, 
one of which was a violation of his probation for forgetting to inform his 
probation officer that he had relocated.  Nevertheless, Mr. Joseph was de-
tained during his removal proceedings for a staggering three and a half years 
until he won his case to remain in the United States and was finally released 
to his family.9   
Sadly, Mr. Joseph’s story is not uncommon.10  Every year, unnecessary 
and widespread immigration detention pursuant to § 1226(c) tears thousands 
of families apart, many of which are comprised of U.S. citizens and legal 
permanent residents, and imprisons people who have a long history of living 
 
3  See Brief for Americans for Immigrant Justice et al., supra note 1, at 5. 
4  Id. at 6. 
5  Id. 
6  Id. at 6–7; see also Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C. (2006)); Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) of 1952 § 236(c). 
7  See generally Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C. (2006)). 
8  See Brief for Americans for Immigrant Justice et al., supra note 1, at 7. 
9  Id.  
10  Id. at 5–12 (noting that “[p]eople like Mr. Joseph . . . are not unique within our immi-
gration system.  For removal cases that are not resolved quickly, it is not uncommon for ad-
ministrative proceedings to last years, and for individuals to win their cases.”).  
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in the United States, prior legal immigration status, and only minor, nonvio-
lent criminal convictions.11 
In the landmark case Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of § 1226(c)’s detention mandate, reasoning that Congress 
has the authority to detain noncitizens for the brief period of their removal 
proceedings to prevent the risk of flight and dangerousness.12  Today, because 
removal proceedings are no longer brief and often prolonged,13 federal courts 
have construed § 1226(c) as having a time limit on prolonged detention with-
out bond, relying heavily on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in 
Demore, which aptly cautioned that due process rights of noncitizens may 
preclude mandatory detention without bond if detention becomes unreason-
ably prolonged or no longer reasonably related “to the purpose for which the 
individual was committed.”14  Federal courts have applied either a bright-
line, six-month rule or a case-by-case approach to determine at what point 
detention without bond is unconstitutionally prolonged.  Of the six circuit 
courts that have addressed this issue, the Second and Ninth Circuits have 
adopted a bright-line, six-month rule where noncitizens are automatically en-
titled to periodic bond hearings upon completing six months of detention.15  
The First, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a case-by-case 
approach, whereby detained noncitizens may file a petition for a writ of ha-
 
11  See, e.g., Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, 
Record Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/more-de-
portations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html (explaining that while the Obama admin-
istration “took steps it portrayed as narrowing the focus of enforcement efforts on criminal 
aliens . . . the records show that the enforcement net actually grew, picking up more and more 
immigrants with minor or no criminal records”); Teresa Wiltz, What Crimes Are Eligible for 
Deportation?, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/re-
search-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/12/21/what-crimes-are-eligible-for-deportation 
(noting that a great number of noncitizens classified as “criminal aliens” under § 1226(c) are 
being deported for minor, nonviolent offenses, such as misdemeanors, probation violations, 
petty theft, and shoplifting). 
12  See generally 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
     13  Prerna Lal, Legal and Extra-Legal Challenges to Immigrant Detention, 24 ASIAN AM. 
L.J. 131, 138 (2017) (noting that after Demore “courts were presented with cases involving 
noncitizens who had been held in custody for periods far in excess” than the period the Court 
found reasonable”). 
14  See Demore, 538 U.S. at 532–33 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Due Pro-
cess—Immigration Detention—Third Circuit Holds that the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 Authorizes Immigration Detention Only for a “Reason-
able Period of Time.”—Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011), 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1522, 1522 (2012) [hereinafter Due Process—Immigration Detention]. 
15  See, e.g., Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 
804 F.3d 1060, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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beas corpus, at which point a federal court will examine the individual cir-
cumstances of each case to determine whether to grant the petition that then 
triggers an individualized bond hearing.16  
Since the Court’s decision in Demore, § 1226(c) has resulted in the pro-
longed detention of numerous noncitizens who have committed crimes that 
fall under § 1226(c)’s list of broad offenses.  The latest data demonstrates 
that there are currently 632,261 pending immigration cases across the United 
States, and the average length of time a pending case takes to conclude is 681 
days or 22 months.17  The current average wait time for a case to conclude 
has significantly increased from previous years.  For example, in 2016, “open 
cases in U.S. Immigration Court [had] been waiting for an average of 667 
days . . . .  This [was] 3.7 [%] longer than the 643 days average wait time at 
the end of FY 2015 (September 2015) and is 17.6 [%] higher than it was at 
the end of FY 2014.”18  Furthermore, many of these detained noncitizens have 
only committed minor, nonviolent offenses, have strong familial ties to fam-
ily members in the U.S. who are legal permanent residents and citizens that 
need their support, and are likely to prevail in winning some form of relief 
because of their strong mitigating equities.19  As a result, prolonged detention 
without bond has encouraged many detained noncitizens just like Mr. Joseph 
to challenge the constitutionality of their prolonged mandatory detention.  
This year, the Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez rejected the 
lower courts’ construction of § 1226(c) and held that interpreting § 1226(c) 
to contain an implicit temporal limit is improper because the statute is neither 
ambiguous or unclear.20  The Court, however, declined to consider whether 
its strict interpretation of § 1226(c) raises constitutional doubts and instead 
remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit to consider those constitutional 
arguments on the merits.21  Justice Breyer, on the other hand, delivered a 
 
16  See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 496 (1st Cir. 2016); Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
825 F.3d 1199, 1217 (11th Cir. 2016); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 231–33 (3d 
Cir. 2011); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 271–73 (6th Cir. 2003). 
17  Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/ 
immigration/court_backlog/ (last visited May 16, 2018); Dana Leigh Marks, Snapshot of the 
Crisis Facing Our Immigration Courts Today: Salient Facts and Urgent Needs, NAT’L ASS’N 
OF IMMIGR. JUDGES (Oct. 2006), http://naij-usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NAIJ 
-Snapshot-October-2015.pdf.  
18  TRAC, Average Wait Time in Immigration Court Rises to 667 Days: TRAC, 
LESIXNEXIS NEWSROOM: IMMIGR. L. (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.lexisnexis.com/ 
legalnewsroom/immigration/b/outsidenews/archive/2016/02/12/average-wait-time-in-immi-
gration-court-rises-to-667-days-trac.aspx. 
     19   See Lal, supra note 13, at 133. 
20  See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
21  Id. at 851 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n.7 (2005)). 
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passionate dissent and argued that the majority’s interpretation of § 1226(c) 
renders the statute unconstitutional because the relevant constitutional lan-
guage, purpose, history, traditions, context, and case law altogether demon-
strate that when confinement is prolonged, even immigration civil confine-
ment, bond hearings are constitutionally required.22 
This Comment argues that the majority’s decision in Jennings v. Rodri-
guez failed to enforce the Constitution and protect the due process rights of 
detained noncitizens by interpreting § 1226(c) as not having a time limit de-
tention without bond.  Federal courts that are given the opportunity to decide 
on the constitutional question should hold, as they have held, that § 1226(c) 
is unconstitutional unless read to include a time limit on indefinite detention 
without bond.  This Comment also contends that while the lower courts cor-
rectly interpreted § 1226(c) to include a time limit, the approaches adopted 
by these federal courts to determine the time limit do not properly protect 
detained noncitizens’ due process rights.  Under both approaches, detention 
without bond is presumed constitutional for at least six months.  This is true 
even for detained noncitizens who have meritorious defenses and strong mit-
igating equities, such as community and familial ties, distinguished military 
service, and prior legal immigration status.  Limiting detainees’ opportunity 
to challenge their continued detention for six months raises the same issues 
of constitutionality that Justice Breyer argued are raised when § 1226(c) is 
interpreted as forbidding an individualized bond hearing.  Alternatively, this 
Comment proposes that detained noncitizens—who pose little risk of flight 
or danger to the community—should receive prosecutorial discretion in the 
form of deferred action as to their continued detention at any point during 
their detention, including during the current approaches’ presumptively rea-
sonable six-month period. 
  Part I outlines the constitutional principle of due process as well as the 
relevant statutory framework of § 1226(c)’s detention mandate.23  Part II dis-
cusses the Supreme Court cases that have considered the constitutionality of 
mandatory detention, and argues that the Court’s decision in Jennings v. Ro-
driguez was wrongly decided because § 1226(c) should be read to contain an 
implicit time limitation on prolonged detention without bond.  This part also 
examines, through case precedent, the approaches applied by the circuit 
courts in determining the time limit of mandatory detention without bond.24  
Finally, Part III of this Comment argues that neither approach adopted by the 
 
22   Id. at 861 (Breyer J., dissenting).  
     23   See infra discussion Part I and accompanying notes. 
     24  See infra discussion Part II and accompanying notes. 
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circuit courts properly balances detainees’ liberty interest against the govern-
ment’s interest in preventing flight and dangerousness.25  This Part instead 
proposes that detained noncitizens—who are neither a flight risk nor a danger 
to the community—should be given prosecutorial discretion in the form of 
deferred action as to their continued mandatory detention at any point after 
being detained.26  If an applicant is denied prosecutorial discretion, he or she 
should then be entitled to automatic and periodic bond hearings beginning 
after six months of detention.27 
 I. DUE PROCESS AND THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF 8 U.S.C. § 1226(C) 
DETENTION MANDATE 
Although Congress has plenary power over matters of immigration pol-
icy, Congress’s power is limited by the Constitution.28  In resolving issues of 
mandatory detention of noncitizens, it is thus important to understand what 
constitutional rights are provided to noncitizens and how they are balanced 
against the statutory framework currently in place. 
A. DUE PROCESS 
Not all classes of persons are afforded identical constitutional rights—
the Constitution explicitly reserves different rights for “natural born Citi-
zens,” “Citizens,” and “Persons.”29  For example, the right to vote30 or to run 
for federal elective office31 is explicitly reserved for Citizens, while the right 
to run for President of the United States is reserved for natural-born Citi-
zens.32  Moreover, in regulating immigration, “Congress regularly makes 
 
     25  See infra discussion Section III.A and accompanying notes. 
     26  See infra discussion Section III.B and accompanying notes.  
     27  See infra discussion Section III.B and accompanying notes. 
28  See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001) (noting that “Congress has ple-
nary power to create immigration law . . . ”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 
713 (1893) (“The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international 
relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is to be regulated by 
treaty or by act of congress . . .”); see also Due Process—Immigration Detention, supra note 
14, at 1523 (“The 123-year-old plenary power doctrine, first enunciated in the so-called Chi-
nese Exclusion Case, affords Congress ‘virtually unlimited’ power to set immigration policy.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
29  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer 
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury . . .”); see also The Honorable Karen Nelson Moore, Madison Lecture: Aliens and the 
Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 806 (2013). 
30  See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
31  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
32  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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rules that would be unacceptable if applied to Citizens.”33  Aside from a few 
explicit limitations, however, most rights provided by the Constitution do not 
acknowledge any distinction between Citizens and noncitizens.34  Among 
these rights afforded to all persons are the equal protection of the laws,35 po-
litical freedoms of speech and association,36 and the due process requirements 
of fair procedure where lives, liberty, or property are at stake.37  Furthermore, 
it is well settled that “Persons” within the meaning of the Constitution in-
cludes both Citizens and noncitizens equally.38 
In the mandatory detention context, the most important constitutional 
right afforded to noncitizens is the right to due process of the law.  The Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process of the 
law.”39  While some lower courts have argued that due process rights do not 
extend to certain classes of noncitizens, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that due process has long been extended to all aliens within the United States’ 
 
33  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–
80 (1976)). 
34  See generally U.S. CONST; see also Moore, supra note 29, at 808. 
35  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
36  U.S. CONST. amend. I; see generally NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (holding that 
freedom of association is an essential part of freedom of speech). 
37  U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. 
38  The Court in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding held:  
It is well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States 
and remains physically present there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment. He may not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process 
of law. Although it later may be established, as respondents contend, that petitioner can 
be expelled and deported, yet before his expulsion, he is entitled to notice of the nature 
of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal. Alt-
hough Congress may prescribe conditions for his expulsion and deportation, not even 
Congress may expel him without allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard.  
344 U.S. 590, 596–598, nn.5–7 (1953); see also David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled 
to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367–388 (2003); see 
generally WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 24:8 (3d ed. 2013) (describing 
protection as it applies to aliens).  
39  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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borders, even those whose presence is “unlawful, involuntary, or transi-
tory.”40  Therefore, a noncitizen “may not be punished prior to an adjudica-
tion of guilt in accordance with due process of law,”41 though “[t]his does not 
preclude . . . civil commitments that are not punitive.”42  In other words, the 
government may civilly commit any person “when there is a finding of future 
dangerousness and an additional factor such as mental illness ‘that makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behav-
ior.’”43  For this reason, “Congress has created specific categories of aliens 
in immigration” that afford noncitizens dissimilar due process procedures for 
removal purposes.44  The following Section discusses the statutory frame-
work that grants the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
the power to detain noncitizens without bond during removal proceedings. 
B. THE 1996 IIRIRA AND § 1226(C) MANDATORY DETENTION 
The IIRIRA, passed by Congress and signed into law by President Bill 
Clinton, is the current controlling law that authorizes the removal of nonciti-
zens residing in the United States.45  Congress’s restructuring of U.S. immi-
gration laws was in part prompted by the aftermath of three major, historical 
events: “the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the initial popularity of anti-
immigrant legislation in California in 1994 (Proposition 187), and the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing.”46  In 1996, Congress enacted the IIRIRA to 
strengthen immigration-enforcement measures at the border and the inte-
rior.47 
The IIRIRA amended the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality 
 
40  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“Once an alien enters the country, the 
legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United 
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or perma-
nent.”); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 
U.S. 33, 49–50 (1950); see generally Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (hold-
ing that aliens may not be incarcerated as punishment for immigration violations without reg-
ular criminal process). 
41  Brian Smith, Charles Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim: Another Step Away From Full Due 
Process Protections, 38 AKRON L. REV. 207, 211 n.25 (2005) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 535–39 (1979)). 
42  See id. at n.26 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)). 
43  Id. at n.28 (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409–10 (2002)).  
44  Moore, supra note 29, at 808. 
45  See generally Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C. (2006)). 
46  Forced Apart: Families Separated and Immigrants Harmed by United States Deporta-
tion Policy, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (July 16, 2007), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0707/ 
5.htm#_Toc169933513 [hereinafter Forced Apart]. 
47  Id. 
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Act (INA) that are relevant to removal of noncitizens who have committed 
crimes “to ensure that the worst noncitizen offenders [are] deported from the 
United States and to reduce the number of court cases” brought in immigra-
tion courts—essentially authorizing fast-track deportation procedures for a 
greater number of noncitizens.48  Overall, the 1996 changes to the IIRIRA 
have resulted in an increased number of detainees and removal of nonciti-
zens, including many noncitizens who have committed relatively minor, non-
violent offenses.49  A description of these changes is important to an under-
standing of § 1226(c)’s detention mandate. 
1. Inadmissibility vs. Deportability 
First, the IIRIRA redefined the distinction between admissible and de-
portable noncitizens.50  Under the IIRIRA, foreign nationals who seek admis-
sion at the border or are not lawfully admitted into the United States are de-
fined as “inadmissible” and subject to the grounds of inadmissibility.51  
Foreign nationals who are admitted lawfully (i.e., visa holders or legal per-
manent residents) are “deportable” and subject to grounds of deportability.52  
While both designations can lead to removal, the distinction is important be-
cause there are differences between the removal grounds for inadmissibility 
and the removal grounds for deportability.   
For example, for the government to deport Legal Permanent Residents 
(LPRs), an immigration judge must “conduct a hearing and sign[] an order of 
removal . . . ,” but DHS is permitted to “administratively” remove, without 
an order from an immigration judge, noncitizens who do not have legal status 
and have committed a criminal offense, such as an aggravated felony.53  Like 
LPRs, many noncitizens without legal status are detained for a protracted 
amount of time pending removal proceedings.  While this Comment primar-
ily focuses on the prolonged detention without bond of LPRs, the prolonged 
 
48  Id.; see also M. Gavan Montague, Should Aliens Be Indefinitely Detained under 8 
U.S.C. § 1231? Suspect Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come under Renewed Scrutiny, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1439, 1443 (2001); Due Process—Immigration Detention, supra note 14, 
at 1522. 
49  Montague, supra note 48, at 1443–44; 1443; see also, generally Immigration Court 
Backlog Tool, supra note 17. 
50  Montague, supra note 49, at 1443; see also 8 U.S.C. § 301 (1996). 
51  Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 212(a)(6), 245(i) (changing the term “entry” to “admission,” 
which requires that an immigration officer inspect and admit an alien, rather than just simply 
accomplishing the act of crossing the border). 
52  Montague, supra note 48, at 1443.  
53 Aggravated Felonies and Deportations, TRAC IMMIGR. (June 9, 2006), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/155/. 
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detention of noncitizens without legal status is equally constitutionally ques-
tionable. 
2. Sections 1226(a) and 1226(c)’s Detention Mandate 
Second, the IIRIRA adopted the mandatory detention provision, § 
1226(c), which requires the mandatory detention of noncitizens who are un-
dergoing removal proceedings for committing a qualifying offense.54  The 
provision states: 
(c) Detention of criminal aliens 
 (1) Custody The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who— 
   (A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 
1182(a)(2) of this title, 
  (B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C) or (D) of this title, 
  (C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an 
offense for which the alien has been sentence[d] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 
year, or 
  (D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under 
section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title, when the alien is released, without regard to whether 
the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to 
whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.55 
Section 1226(c)’s mandatory detention provision only applies to noncit-
izens who are designated “criminal aliens.”  This designation is important 
because it triggers the Attorney General’s (AG) obligation to detain a noncit-
izen.  As the statute above reads, the AG “shall take into custody,” upon re-
lease from prison, parole, or probation, any alien deemed deportable on the 
basis of committing an offense covered under the statute.56   The Attorney 
General, therefore, has little discretion in detaining noncitizens who have 
committed qualifying offenses, and on its face, § 1226(c) provides no statu-
tory possibility for release on bond.57   
Conversely, noncitizens designated as noncriminal aliens are subject to 
 
54  Montague, supra note 48, at 1444; Due Process—Immigration Detention, supra note 
14, at 1522.  
55  8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012). 
56  8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).  These offenses include crimes involving “moral turpitude,” viola-
tion of any state, federal, or foreign law “involving a substance,” aggravated felonies, certain 
firearm offenses, or any crime related to espionage, sabotage, treason, and sedition, or a vio-
lation of the Military Selective Service Act.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i); 8 U.C.S. 
§§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B)-(D). 
57  Due Process—Immigration Detention, supra note 14, at 1522. 
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discretionary detention during removal proceedings.58  Section 1226(a) pro-
vides that the AG may arrest a noncriminal alien “pending a decision on 
whether the alien is to be removed from the Unites States,” and the AG has 
discretion to “continue to detain the alien; and . . . release the alien on . . . 
bond . . . or conditional parole.”59  Thus, under this provision, the AG is au-
thorized to detain a noncriminal alien but is not required to by law, and there 
is a statutory possibility for release on bond. 
3. Qualifying Offenses Under § 1226(c) 
Third, the IIRIRA broadened the grounds that qualify for mandatory de-
tention under § 1226(c) by expanding the definition of an “aggravated fel-
ony” to encompass crimes involving more than a one-year prison sentence, 
crime of moral turpitude, and crimes involving controlled substances or fire-
arms.60  These new broad categories of crimes are not easily determined, are 
often confusing and vague, and are not all defined under federal law.61  For 
example, regularly described as a nebulous concept, a crime involving moral 
turpitude is not defined by federal law; instead, courts have defined the crime 
as “generally a crime that (1) is vile, base, or depraved and (2) violates ac-
cepted moral standards.”62  Furthermore, under this new scheme, the term 
“aggravated felony” not only covers severe crimes commonly characterized 
as felonies, such as rape, drug trafficking, and murder, but also incorporates 
less serious crimes, such as petty theft or shoplifting, that are considered mis-
demeanors in some states but are re-characterized as felonies for immigration 
purposes because they carry a potential one-year sentence.63   
These new broad categories of crimes that trigger mandatory detention 
 
58  Id.  
59  8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012).  
60  Id.; Due Process—Immigration Detention, supra note 14, at 1522. 
61  See Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 2014); Keungne v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
561 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that a crime of moral turpitude “involves ‘an act 
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his 
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and 
duty between man and man’”) (quoting Vuksanovic v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 439 F.3d 1308, 1311 
(11th Cir. 2006)); see also Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (defining moral 
turpitude as “conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules 
of morality and the duties owed other persons, either individually or to society in general”). 
62  See Aggravated Felonies: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Dec. 16, 2016), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/aggravated-felonies-overview (noting 
that “judges have noted numerous “non-violent, fairly trivial misdemeanors are considered 
aggravated felonies under our immigration laws.”); see also Dawn Marie Johnson, AEDPA 
and the IIRIRA: Treating Misdemeanors as Felonies for Immigration Purposes, The Legisla-
tive Reform, 27 J. LEGIS. 477, 477–78 (2001). 
63  Aggravated Felonies: An Overview, supra note 63. 
MEDRANO_PAGE PROOF 6/2/18  4:34 PM 
610 PEGUERO MEDRANO [Vol. 108 
have had a significant impact.  In one particular case, Mario, a nineteen-year 
old legal permanent resident, “was convicted for possession of 2.5 grams of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, which is a misdemeanor offense under 
Illinois law.”64  Even though Mario was only sentenced to a “year of super-
vision—a sentence that is less severe than probation,” the court re-character-
ized his crime as a felony under immigration law, and he was subsequently 
subject to mandatory detention.65 
4. The Impact of the 1996 IIRIRA 
Congress’s purpose in making these sweeping changes to immigration 
policy was “based upon the [g]overnment’s concerns over the risks of flight 
and danger to the community.”66  According to a Senate Report, § 1226(c) 
was enacted “to curtail the ‘serious and growing threat to public safety’ posed 
by criminal noncitizens.”67  At the time the statute was enacted, more than 
20% of all undetained noncitizens who had been convicted of a crime failed 
to report to their removal proceedings.68  Therefore, Congress enacted 
§ 1226(c) to require that all noncitizens that have committed a deportable 
offense be detained during removal proceedings on the basis of safety con-
cerns as well as accountability.69 
Congress, however, did not envision § 1226(c) as an indefinite prison 
sentence for noncitizens that have already served their prison sentence: in 
1996, removal proceedings took at most 90 days to be completed.70  Over the 
years, however, the broadened offenses that fell within the grounds of deport-
ability and immigration priorities have created an influx in the number of 
removal cases, which has contributed to the immigration court backlog and 
increase in wait time for the start and completion of removal proceedings.71   
Today, however, immigration judges (IJs) are unlikely to complete re-
moval proceedings in the 90 days.72  Data show that as of July 2017, the 
average number of days a case is pending on the immigration court docket 
 
64  Forced Apart, supra note 46. 
65  Id. 
66  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). 
67  See Gerard Savaresse, When Is When?: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(C) and the Requirements of 
Mandatory Detention, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 285, 299 (2013). 
68  Id. 
69  Id. at 300. 
70  Id. at 299. 
71  Despite Hiring, Immigration Court Backlog and Wait Times Climb, TRAC IMMIGR. 
(May 15, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/468/. 
72  See TRAC, supra note 18. 
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until decision is 682 days, and in some states—specifically Colorado, Mich-
igan, Illinois, Nebraska, Ohio, California, New Jersey, Arizona, Nevada, and 
Georgia—the wait time substantially exceeds that average.73  For example, 
in Colorado, the average is a staggering 1,037 days; in Illinois, the average is 
1,007 days; in Texas, the average is 818 days; and in New Jersey, the average 
is 814 days.74  For noncitizens charged with criminal offenses, including 
noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(c), the national average number of 
days a case is pending before a decision is entered is even higher, at 897 days, 
with Texas’s average being the highest at 1,132 days.75  Section 1226(c) has 
thus had a significant effect on the number of detained noncitizens, “with 
harsh consequences for these individuals, their families, and communities 
across the country.”76 
In short, the 1996 IIRIRA made sweeping changes that broadened the 
types of crimes that could result in mandatory detention and possible re-
moval. These changes have resulted in the prolonged mandatory detention of 
many immigrants, including those who have legal residency, for committing 
minor, nonviolent offenses that are not even classified as egregious crimes 
on the state level. 
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE TWO APPROACHES ADOPTED BY 
THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
Key Supreme Court and circuit court cases have addressed mandatory 
detention pursuant to § 1226(c).  As the following Sections explain, while the 
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of mandatory detention with-
out bond of “criminal” noncitizens undergoing removal proceedings, circuit 
courts have interpreted the statute to contain an implicit time limitation.  
These lower courts have applied differing approaches to determine at what 
point detention without bond becomes unreasonably prolonged or unjusti-
fied.  The following Sections examine these key cases. 
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT PRE-JENNINGS 
Two landmark Supreme Court cases addressed the constitutionality of 
prolonged detention of noncitizens: Zadvydas v. Davis77 and Demore v. 
Kim.78  In Zadvydas, the Court held that indefinite detention of noncitizens 
 
73  Immigration Court Backlog Tool, supra note 17. 
74  See TRAC, supra note 18. 
75  Id. 
76  Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration Deten-
tion, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 363 (2014). 
77  See generally 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
78  See generally 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
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post-removal order is constitutionally impermissible past six months unless 
the government can demonstrate removal in the foreseeable future or a spe-
cial circumstance.79  While Zadvydas does not concern § 1226(c) pre-re-
moval-order detention, lower courts have cited the decision for support in 
interpreting § 1226(c).80   
In Demore, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of § 1226(c) 
on the basis of Congress’s concerns of flight risk and dangerousness, and 
importantly on the finding that in a majority of cases, detention had a definite 
termination date of less than 90 days.81  The Demore decision was a signifi-
cant setback for the due process rights of detained noncitizens: despite the 
Court’s view of promptness in removal proceedings, many detainees have 
been detained far longer than the 90-day period the court envisioned.82 
1. Zadvydas v. Davis 
Zadvydas involved two cases from separate jurisdictions that were con-
solidated by the Court, where both noncitizens were detained indefinitely 
post-removal order.83  Kestutis Zadvydas, an LPR born in a displaced persons 
camp in Germany to Lithuanian parents who immigrated with his family to 
the U.S. when he was eight-years-old, filed the first case.84  Zadvydas had an 
extensive criminal record of attempted robbery in the third degree,85 and a 
history of flight.86  Zadvydas completed sixteen years in prison for his crimes 
and was released on parole.87 He was then taken into custody by immigration 
officials, and subsequently ordered to be deported to Germany in 1994.88  
However, Germany and Lithuania refused to accept Zadvydas, claiming that 
he was not a citizen of either country.89  The second case involved Kim Ho 
 
79  533 U.S. at 679. 
80  See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 843 (2018). 
81  538 U.S. at 512. 
82  Joren Lyons, Mandatory Detention During Removal Proceedings: Challenging the Ap-
plicability of Demore v. Kim to Vietnamese and Laotian Detainees, 12 ASIAN AM. L.J. 231, 
239 (2005). 
83  See 533 U.S. at 686.   
84  Id. at 684. 
85  Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (E.D. La. 1997), rev’d sub 
nom.  Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), vacated sub nom.  Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), opinion withdrawn and superseded sub nom.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 
285 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002), aff’d as modified sub nom.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 285 F.3d 398 
(5th Cir. 2002). 
86  Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. At 1014. 
87  Id.  
88  Id. at 1015. 
89  See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684; see generally Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), 
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Ma, a resident alien born in Cambodia who fled with his family to Thailand 
and the Philippines before arriving in the United States at the age of seven.90  
Ma was convicted of manslaughter, and after completing his prison sentence, 
he was released, detained by immigration officials, and ordered to be re-
moved from the United States.91 Similar to Zadvydas, Ma could not return to 
his home country. 
Because Zadvydas and Ma could not return back to their home coun-
tries, they remained civilly detain indefinitely in immigration detention cen-
ters.92  After being detained for years, both filed habeas petitions in their re-
spective jurisdictions arguing that permanent confinement pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) was unconstitutional, and the federal district courts 
ordered them released on those grounds.93  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit re-
versed the district court’s holding in Mr. Zadvydas’s case, reasoning that “de-
tention did not violate the Constitution because eventual deportation was not 
‘impossible,’ good-faith efforts to remove Zadvydas from the United States 
continued, and Zadvydas’s detention was subject to periodic administrative 
review.”94  On appeal in Ma’s case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his release and 
“concluded, based in part on constitutional concerns, that the statute did not 
authorize detention for more than a ‘reasonable time’ beyond the 90-day pe-
riod authorized for removal.”95  The Supreme Court subsequently granted 
writs in both cases, joined them for oral argument, and decided them to-
gether.96 
Section 1231(a)(1)(A) states that “when [a noncitizen] is ordered to be 
removed, the [AG] shall remove the alien from the [U.S.] within a period of 
90 days.”97  If the alien is not removed after the 90-day period expires, an 
noncitizen “may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall 
be subject to the terms of supervision.”98  While some courts have interpreted 
 
vacated sub nom.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), opinion modified and reinstated 
sub nom.  Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001). 
90  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 685; Reno, 208 F.3d at 819. 
91  Id. 
92  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699; Reno, 208 F.3d at 819.  
93  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85; Reno, 208 F.3d at 820. 
94  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 685; see generally Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011 
(E.D. La. 1997), rev’d sub nom.  Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), va-
cated sub nom.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), opinion withdrawn and superseded 
sub nom.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 285 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002), aff’d as modified sub nom.  
Zadvydas v. Davis, 285 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002). 
95  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 686; see Reno, 208 F.3d at 827. 
96  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 686. 
97  8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
98  8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1), (6) (2012). 
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the plain language of § 1231(a)(1)(A) as allowing for the indefinite detention 
of noncitizens unable to leave the U.S., the Supreme Court in Zadvydas found 
“nothing in the history of these statutes that clearly demonstrate[d] a congres-
sional intent to authorize indefinite, and perhaps permanent, detention.”99  
The Court held that the INA’s post-removal-period detention provision 
contains an implicit reasonableness limitation of six months.100 The Court 
reasoned that while the plain language of § 1231(a)(1)(A) does not impose 
an explicit limitation on detention after the 90-day removal period, “inter-
preting the statute to avoid a serious constitutional threat . . . once removal is 
no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized 
by statute.”101  Further, the Court explained that “for the sake of uniform ad-
ministration in the federal courts,”. . . six months is the appropriate “reason-
able time” after which the “alien provides good reason to believe that there 
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, 
the [g]overnment must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that show-
ing.”102   
The Court’s decision in Zadvydas was a major step in the right direction 
for protecting the due process rights of detained noncitizens.  The Court rec-
ognized that noncitizens, even noncitizens who are ordered deported, are pro-
tected by the Constitution, and detaining noncitizens indefinitely without 
bond violates their constitutional rights to liberty and due process under the 
law. 
2. Demore v. Kim 
Two years after Zadvydas was decided, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to the case Demore v. Kim, which challenged the constitutionality of 
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).103  Hyung Joon Kim came to 
the United States from South Korea when he was six years old as an LPR.104  
As an adult, Kim was convicted of “petty theft with priors,” and after he 
completed his sentence, he was detained pending his removal proceeding 
pursuant to § 1226(c).105  Kim filed a habeas petition arguing that he was 
entitled to a bond hearing to determine whether he “posed either a danger to 
the community or a flight risk.”106  The district court agreed and held that 
 
99  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. 
100  Id. at 680–81.  
101  Id. at 699. 
102  Id. at 701. 
103  See generally Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
104  Id. at 513. 
105  Id.  
106  Id. 
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unless § 1226(c) is interpreted to contain an implicit time limitation to deten-
tion without bond, the statute unconstitutionally deprives noncitizens of their 
right to due process.107  Kim was subsequently granted a bond hearing and 
released on a $5,000 bond.108  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s decision and concluded that “[the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS), since subsumed into DHS] had not provided a ‘special justifi-
cation’ for no-bail civil detention sufficient to overcome a lawful permanent 
resident alien’s liberty interest.”109  The government appealed.110 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ deci-
sions and held that § 1226(c) was constitutional.111  The Court opined that 
“[a]lthough the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process in deportation 
proceedings, detention during such proceedings is a constitutionally valid as-
pect of the process, even where . . . there has been no finding that they are 
unlikely to appear for their deportation proceedings.”112  The Court empha-
sized Congress’s  concern that deportable noncitizens who have committed 
prior crimes are likely to continue to engage in crime and fail to show up for 
deportation hearings in large numbers.113  Furthermore, the Court distin-
guished Zadvydas and explained that while there was a real concern of pos-
sible indefinite detention under § 1231(a)(1)(A), such a concern does not ex-
ist under § 1226(c) because detainees are only detained for the duration of 
their removal proceedings, which at the time was mostly a period of “less 
than . . . 90 days.”114  Thus, in deciding that § 1226(c) is constitutional, the 
court focused centrally on the brief duration of mandatory detention at the 
time Demore was decided. 
While Justice Kennedy joined the opinion of the Court by providing the 
vital fifth vote in the majority’s 5–4 opinion, he wrote a noteworthy concur-
ring opinion that left open the possibility of constitutional concerns that may 
arise when detention becomes unreasonably prolonged: 
[S]ince the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful per-
manent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized deter-
mination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became 
unreasonable or unjustified.  Were there to be an unreasonable delay by the INS in 
 
107  See Kim v. Schiltgen, No. C 99-2257SI, 1999 WL 33944060, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
10, 1999).  
108  Id. 
109  Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir. 2002).  
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 511 (2003) (citations omitted). 
113  Id. at 513.  
114  Id. at 511–12.  
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pursuing and completing deportation proceedings, it could become necessary then to 
inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk 
of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.115 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion makes clear that while the Demore de-
cision upheld the constitutionality of mandatory detention, detention without 
a bond hearing must be limited in duration so as not to deprive noncitizens 
of their right to due process. 
Since Demore, “courts have struggled to reconcile Zadvydas and 
Demore in the context of pre-removal detention.”116  While the Supreme 
Court in Zadvydas held that post-removal detention becomes unreasonably 
prolonged at the six-month mark, Demore upheld the constitutionality of 
mandatory detention pre-removal-order without determining at what point 
such detention becomes unreasonably prolonged.117  Prior to the recent Su-
preme Court decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, federal courts have recon-
ciled these two decisions by interpreting § 1226(c) to include an implied time 
limit against prolonged detention without bond.118  To determine at which 
point detention without bond is unconstitutional, federal courts have adopted 
a bright-line and case-by-case approach.  
B. CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH PRE-JENNINGS 
The First, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a case-by-
case approach is a better-suited approach for determining when mandatory 
detention without bond is unjustified.119  The case-by-case approach permits 
a detained noncitizen to file a habeas petition that if granted, triggers a bond 
hearing.  
1. Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security 
In Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, the petitioner, Cheikh Diop, was a 
Senegalese citizen who unlawfully migrated to the United States and was 
 
115  Id. at 532–33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also Savaresse, supra 
note 67, at 301. 
116  Michelle Firemacion, Protecting Immigrants from Prolonged Pre-Removal Detention: 
When it “Depends” is No Longer Reasonable, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 601, 608 (2015). 
117  Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001)); see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 510. 
118  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 510 (2003). 
119  See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016); Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 
F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011); Ly v. 
Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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convicted and taken into custody for committing the crime of “recklessly en-
dangering another person.”120  At his second hearing, where Diop was repre-
senting himself, the government charged him with the additional crime of 
having possessed a controlled substance with the intent to manufacture or 
distribute.121  Following the second conviction, Diop filed multiple motions 
and appeals to the court, all while detained pending his removal proceeding 
pursuant to § 1226(c)’s detention mandate.  By the time the case reached the 
appellate court, Diop was detained for a total of “1,072 days—two years, 
eleven months, and five days.”122   
The facts in Diop perfectly demonstrate that interpreting § 1226(c) with-
out a time limit can result in serious constitutional issues.123  As the Third 
Circuit pointed out, this was exactly the concern of Justice Kennedy in 
Demore: § 1226(c) detention mandate “might still violate the Due Process 
Clause if ‘the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.’”124  
Diop’s situation was exactly the prolonged detention that becomes unreason-
able and constitutionally impermissible.125  The Third Circuit construed § 
1226(c) as containing an implicit time limitation against prolonged detention 
without bond.126 The court adopted a case-by-case approach to determine the 
time limit where courts “make an individualized inquiry into whether deten-
tion is still necessary to fulfill the statute’s purposes of ensuring that a noncit-
izen attends removal proceedings and that his or her release will not pose a 
danger to the community.”127   
2. Ly v. Hansen 
In Ly v. Hansen, Hoang Minh Ly was a Vietnam refugee who entered 
the United States in 1986.128  Ly was convicted of credit card and bank fraud, 
and he fully served his sentence on both convictions.129  Shortly after being 
released, the INS took Ly into custody and the IJ entered a written order stat-
ing that Ly was removable to Vietnam.  The Board of Immigration appealed, 
and the government filed a motion with the Sixth Circuit to remand the case 
 
120  Diop, 656 F.3d at 223. 
121  Id. at 224. 
122  Id. at 223. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. at 232 (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532 (2003)). 
125  Id. at 233. 
126  Id. at 234 (reasoning that “[r]easonableness, by its very nature, is a fact-dependent 
inquiry requiring an assessment of all of the circumstances of any given case”). 
127  Id. at 231. 
128  Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 2003). 
129  Id. 
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back to the district court.  Ly was detained for 500 days while these proceed-
ings were taking place and was only released afterward by the INS, subject 
to specific conditions and supervision.130 
The Third Circuit held that due process requires that § 1226(c) be inter-
preted as having a time limit against unreasonably prolonged and unjustified 
detention.  The court rejected the bright-line approach and adopted a case-
by-case approach reasoning that the “bright-line limitation . . . would not be 
appropriate,” because “courts must examine the facts of each case, to deter-
mine whether there has been unreasonable delay in concluding removal pro-
ceedings.”131  
3. Reid v. Donelan 
In Reid v. Donelan, Mark Anthony Reid came to the United States as an 
LPR, served in the U.S. Army, pursued higher education, and owned his own 
business.132  However, “Reid amassed an extensive criminal record, includ-
ing larceny, assault, drug and weapon possession, failure to appear, interfer-
ing with an officer, driving on a suspended license, selling drugs, violation 
of probation, and burglary.”133  After completing his prison sentence, Reid 
was released and subsequently detained pursuant to § 1226(c) without a bond 
hearing134 for over a year pending removal proceedings.135  Reid filed a ha-
beas petition along with a class-action suit and argued that “§ 1226(c) con-
tains an implicit ‘reasonableness’ requirement and should be read to author-
ize mandatory detention only up to six months, at which time the government 
must provide a bond hearing.”136   
On appeal, the First Circuit held that, based on the doctrine of constitu-
tional avoidance, § 1226(c) should be read to include an implicit time limit.137  
The court, however, disagreed with the bright-line, six-month rule, and in-
stead adopted a case-by-case approach, listing factors to “provide guideposts 
for other courts.”138  The court’s factors included length of the detention, 
 
130  Id. 
131  Id. at 271. 
132  Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 491 (1st Cir. 2016). 
133  Id. 
134  Id. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. at 492. 
137  Id. at 496 (reasoning that “the secondary six-month rule was predicated on there being 
no foreseeable hope of removal” and that under § 1226(c), removability, as well as release in 
some circumstances, is foreseeable). 
138  Id. at 501. 
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foreseeability of proceedings concluding in the near future, period of deten-
tion compared to the completed criminal sentence, the promptness (or delay) 
of the immigration authorities or the detainee, and the likelihood that the pro-
ceedings will culminate in a final removal order.139 
4. Sopo v. U.S. Attorney General 
The latest case to advocate the case-by-case approach is Sopo v. United 
States Attorney General.140  In this case, the petitioner, Maxi Dingo Sopo, 
came to the U.S. on asylum from Cameroon, and after being in the country 
for six years, he pled guilty to an aggravated felony.141  Sopo was taken into 
custody after completing his criminal sentence, and he subsequently filed a 
habeas petition requesting a bond hearing.142   
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that as a matter of constitutional 
avoidance, § 1226(c) must be construed to contain an implicit time limit.143  
The court adopted a case-by-case approach, reasoning that such an approach 
“adheres more closely to legal precedent and the practical advantages.”144  
Like the First Circuit in Reid, the Eleventh Circuit enumerated non-exhaus-
tive reasonableness factors: the amount of time that the noncitizen has been 
in detention without a bond hearing; reasons for the protracted proceedings; 
the possibility of removal after a final order of removal; whether the de-
tainee’s civil immigration detention exceeds the time the detainee spent in 
prison for the crime that rendered him removable; and whether the facility 
for the civil immigration detention is meaningfully different from a penal in-
stitution for criminal detention.145  
C. BRIGHT-LINE APPROACH PRE-JENNINGS 
The Second and Ninth Circuits adopted a bright-line rule of six months 
for presumptive reasonableness pre-removal orders, after which a noncitizen 
is entitled to periodic bond hearings to determine whether continued deten-
tion is reasonable or justified.  
1. Lora v. Shanahan 
In Lora v. Shanahan, Alexander Lora was convicted of a felony drug 
 
139  Id. at 500. 
140  Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1217 (11th Cir. 2016). 
141  Id. at 1201. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Sopo, 825 F.3d at 1201. 
145  Id. at 1218. 
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offense in the United States, and after completing his prison sentence, he was 
taken into custody pursuant to § 1226(c).146  Lora subsequently filed a habeas 
petition challenging his continued detention and argued that imprisonment 
without a bond hearing raised constitutional due process concerns.147  The 
district court agreed and ordered Lora’s release, and the government ap-
pealed.148  
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that while a constitutional argument 
was not presented in this case, § 1226(c) must be read to include a time limit 
on prolonged detention without bond,149 and  adopted the bright-line ap-
proach.150  First, it reasoned that “Zadvydas and Demore, taken together, sug-
gest that the preferred approach for avoiding due process concerns in this area 
is to establish a presumptively reasonable six-month period of detention.”151 
Second, “the pervasive inconsistency and confusion exhibited by district 
courts in this Circuit when asked to apply a reasonableness test on a case-by-
case basis weighs . . . in favor of adopting an approach that affords more 
certainty and predictability.”152   
The court explained that this is especially true for the Ninth and Second 
Circuits that “have been disproportionately burdened by a surge in immigra-
tion appeals and a corresponding surge in the sizes of their immigration dock-
ets.”153  The court noted that the number of noncitizens detained pursuant to 
§ 1226(c) has substantially increased with the passage of the IIRIRA that 
“expanded the definition of criminal aliens . . . who violate state criminal 
laws, which, combined with a simultaneous rise in immigration to the United 
States, has resulted in an enormous increase in the number of aliens taken 
into custody pending removal.”154  Third, the court reasoned that without a 
six-month rule, endless months of detention—often caused by nothing more 
than bureaucratic backlog—will have real-life consequences for immigrants 
and their families.155 
 
146  Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2015). 
147  Id. 
148  See generally Lora v. Shanahan, 15 F. Supp. 3d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 804 F.3d 
601 (2d Cir. 2015). 
149   Lora, 804 F.3d at 614–15. 
150  Id. at 616. 
151  Id. at 615. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. at 615–16. 
154  Id. at 604. 
155  Id. at 616. 
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2. Rodriguez v. Robbins I and II 
In Rodriguez I, Alejandro Rodriguez, an LPR, was detained during the 
course of his removal proceedings.156  After three years of incarceration, 
Alejandro and a class of detained LPRs he represented filed a habeas corpus 
petition that argued that §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) do not authorize 
prolonged detention without bond.157  The district court granted the class a 
preliminary injunction and ordered the government to provide individual 
hearings before an IJ to determine whether continued detention was justified, 
and the government appealed.158  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, re-
lying on the canon of constitutional avoidance to construe the relevant provi-
sions as imposing a time limit on prolonged detention without bond.159  The 
court adopted a bright-line rule, concluding that “detention is prolonged 
when it has lasted six months and is expected to continue more than mini-
mally beyond six months.”160 
After the Ninth Circuit decided Rodriguez v. Robbins I, the district court 
granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction on behalf of the en-
tire class, and the government again appealed the decision of the lower court 
to the Ninth Circuit.161  In Rodriguez v. Robbins II, the Ninth Circuit again 
affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that § 1226(c) detainees are en-
titled to automatic and periodic bond hearings after six months of deten-
tion.162  The Ninth Circuit described the devastating nature of civil immigra-
tion for detained noncitizens: 
Class members spend, on average, 404 days in immigration detention . . . .  In some 
cases, detention has lasted much longer: As of April 28, 2012, when the government 
generated data to produce to the petitioners, one class member had been detained for 
1,585 days, approaching four and a half years of civil confinement. Non-citizens who 
vigorously pursue claims for relief from removal face substantially longer detention 
periods than those who concede removability . . . .  Class members frequently have 
 
156  See Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez I), 715 F.3d 1127, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2013). 
157  Id.  
158  Id.; see also Rodriguez v. Robbins, Nos. CV 07–03239–TJH (RNBx), SA CV 11–
01287–TJH (RNBx), 2012 WL 7653016, *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2012). 
159  Rodriguez I, 715 F.3d at 1137, 1146. 
160   Id. at 1138 (quoting Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 n.13 (9th Cir. 2011)) 
(“[D]etention is prolonged when it has lasted six months and is expected to continue more than 
minimally beyond six months.”). 
161  See Rodriguez v. Holder, No. CV 07-3239 TJH (RNBX), 2013 WL 5229795, *1 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2015). 
162  Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 804 F.3d 1060, 1065, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015) (con-
cluding that “class members are entitled to automatic bond hearings after six months of deten-
tion”). 
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strong ties to this country . . . .  Prolonged detention imposes severe hardship on class 
members and their families.163 
The Ninth Circuit stated that prolonged detention of this nature raises serious 
constitutional issues of “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government 
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint,” all of which lie “at 
the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”164  Relying on 
Rodriguez I, the court adopted a “six-month mark” for when detention with-
out bond becomes prolonged.165 
On March 25, 2016, petitioner David Jennings, in his capacity as the 
field office director of the Los Angeles, California Office of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Su-
preme Court challenging the Ninth Circuit’s decision.166  The Supreme Court 
granted writ to Jennings v. Rodriguez and recently issued its opinion on the 
case. 
D. JENNINGS V. RODRIGUEZ 
The Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez reversed the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s opinion in Rodriguez II and held that § 1226(c) cannot be interpreted 
to contain an implicit time limitation because the statute, according to the 
Court, was clear and unambiguous.167  The majority’s opinion, however, left 
much unanswered as the Court declined to consider whether its interpretation 
of § 1226(c) rendered the statute unconstitutional.168  Rather, the Court re-
manded the case back to the Ninth Circuit to consider whether its interpreta-
tion is unconstitutional.169 The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, written 
by Justice Breyer, fervently disagreed with the majority’s opinion and ad-
dressed the constitutional concerns of interpreting § 1226(c) as not contain-
ing an implicit time limit on detention without bond.170  
 
163  Rodriguez II, 804 F.3d at 1072–73. 
164  Id. at 1066 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001)). 
165  Id. at 1079. 
166  See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016). 
167  See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
168  Id. at 851. 
169  Id. 
170  Id. at 861 (Breyer J., dissenting). 
MEDRANO 6/2/18  4:34 PM 
2018] NOT YET GONE 623 
1. The Opinion171  
       In Jennings, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez 
II misapplied the canon of constitutional avoidance to construe §§ 1225(b), 
1226(a), and 1226(c) as including a time limit on prolonged detention with-
out bond.172 The court explained that “[t]he canon of constitutional avoidance 
comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, 
the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one construction.”173 After 
an examination of the text of each provision, the Court concluded that, be-
cause “the relevant statutory provisions is clear,” the canon does not apply 
and the lower court’s construction is implausible.174 
        In regard to § 1226(c) specifically, the Court reasoned that first “§ 
1226(c) is not ‘silent’ as to the length of detention” because the statute’s lan-
guage mandates detention pending a decision on removal.175  Second, § 
1226(c)’s specification that certain circumstances may lead to a detainee’s 
release, such as witness protection purposes, demonstrates that other forms 
of release, such as release on bond, are prohibited.176  Third, the Court rea-
soned that § 1226(c) “together with § 1226(a) . . . makes clear that detention 
of aliens within its scope must continue ‘pending a decision’ on removal.”177  
For these reasons, the Court concluded that an analysis of § 1226(c)’s statu-
tory language “falls far short of a ‘plausible statutory construction’” suffi-
cient to invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance.178  
        The Court, however, declined to address the constitutional argument—
whether its strict interpretation of § 1226(c) renders the statute unconstitu-
tional.  Instead, the court stated that: 
[b]ecause the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that periodic bond hearings are 
required under the immigration provisions at issue here, it had no occasion to consider 
respondents' constitutional arguments on their merits.  Consistent with our role as ‘a 
court of review, not of first view,’ we do not reach those arguments.  Instead, we remand 
the case to the Court of Appeals to consider them in the first instance.179 
 
171  This section does not discuss the facts and procedural history involved in Jennings as 
they are identical to the facts described above in Rodriguez I and II.  
172  Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842. 
173 Id. (citing Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
174 Id. at 849. 
175  Id. 
176  Id. 
177  Id. 
178  Id. 
179  Id. at 851 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n.7 (2005)). 
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2. The Dissent 
Writing with passionate opposition, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented to all parts of the majority’s decision.180  
First, the dissent described the key characteristics of the group of noncitizens 
that were a part of the class action before the Court.181  The dissent described 
that all the asylum seekers were fleeing persecution from their home coun-
tries, all the detainees who have committed crimes were detained after serv-
ing their criminal sentences, and all members of the third group who arrived 
at the borders seeking entry for reasons other than asylum might have a mer-
itorious claim to admissibility.182  The dissent further explained that these 
classes of detained noncitizens “number in thousands,” the length of deten-
tion is often prolonged, many of the detainees eventually do actually obtain 
relief, immigration detention centers where these detainees are confined are 
similar in many respects to prisons and jails, and in some cases, the condi-
tions of detention are significantly worse.183 
         The dissent then addressed the constitutional question that the majority 
declined to consider—whether § 1226(c) entitled detainees to bond hearings 
to determine whether he or she poses a risk of flight or a danger to the com-
munity.  Breyer concluded: “In my view, the relevant constitutional lan-
guage, purposes, history, tradition, and case law all make clear that the ma-
jority’s interpretation at the very least would raise ‘grave doubts’ about the 
statute’s constitutionality.”184   
          First, the dissent considered the relevant constitutional language and 
the values that it protects.  It argued that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause extends to all persons within the territory of the U.S., irrespective of 
a person’s immigration status.185  This is because “[f]reedom from arbitrary 
detention is as ancient and important a right as any found within the Consti-
tution's boundaries.”186  Second, the dissent argued that American history 
also demonstrates that bail is a practice that is entrenched in our legal sys-
tem.187  The dissent explained that Blackstone and the Judiciary Act of 1798 
 
180  Id. at 860 (Breyer J., dissenting). 
181  Id. 
182  Id. 
183  Id. at 860–61. 
184  Id. at 861. 
185  Id. at 862 (“No one can claim, nor since the time of slavery has anyone to my 
knowledge successfully claimed, that persons held within the United States are totally without 
constitutional protection.”) 
186  Id. 
187  Id. at 863. 
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both provided rights to bail.188  Today, similar practices have remained part 
of our legal tradition, for example all criminal cases have been provided the 
possibility of release on bail under federal laws.189  Furthermore, the dissent 
noted that while immigration detention cases are not criminal cases, there is 
a strong “basis for reading the Constitution’s bail requirements as extending 
to” civil immigration cases as “the law treats like cases alike.  And reason 
tells us that the civil confinement at issue here and the pretrial criminal con-
finement that calls for bail are in every relevant sense identical.”190 
Third, the dissent examined case law and argued that the Court, while 
sometimes denying bail to some individuals, had never held that bail is un-
necessary.191  The court cited several decisions from different time periods in 
American history, ending with the Court’s decision in Demore, which only 
found detention without bond constitutional for a limited period of time to 
arrange removal.192  Fourth, the dissent argued that the statutory language 
“shall be detained” under § 1226(c) does not mean that the detained nonciti-
zens must be detained without bail193 because the word “detain” is ambiguous 
and has readily coexisted with the word bail.194  Lastly, the dissent argued 
that there is also nothing in the statute or the legislative history that demon-
strates Congress intended prolonged detention without bail. 
In regard to § 1226(c), specifically, the dissent argued that the statute’s 
use of the term “take into custody” has long been interpreted as not requiring 
that a prisoner be confined, and at any rate should not be interpreted differ-
ently from “detain.”195  In addition, § 1226(c)’s phrase that prohibits the stat-
ute from applying to persons in witness protection also does not demonstrate 
that detention without bail is authorized by the statute “because the phrase 
has nothing to do with bail.  It has to do with a special program, the Witness 
Protection Program, set forth in . . . § 3521” which “allows the Attorney Gen-
eral to relocate the witness, to give him an entirely new identity, to help his 
family similarly, and to pay him a stipend, among other things.”196 
 
188  Id. 
189  Id. at 864. 
190  Id. at 865. 
191   Id. 
192  Id. at 866–69. 
193  Id. at 870. 
194  Id. at 872. 
195  Id. 
196  Id. at 873. 
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3. Argument in Favor of the Dissent 
  The majority’s decision in Jennings failed to enforce the Constitution 
and protect the due process rights of detained noncitizens. As Justice Breyer 
argued, the majority’s interpretation of § 1226(c) at the very least raises seri-
ous doubts about the statute’s constitutionality as applied to detained noncit-
izens.  However, the majority declined to even consider the constitutional 
question, and in doing so, it also declined to protect the constitutional rights 
of detained noncitizens.  
  Section 1226(c) is not clear or unambiguous.  First, § 1226(c)’s men-
tion of bail is irrelevant.  While there is nothing in the language of § 1226(c) 
that states that bail is required, there is also nothing in the language of the 
statute that authorizes detention without bail.  As Justice Breyer argued, what 
is clear is that bail has been historically provided to detained individuals 
throughout our country’s history and even today. Second, the majority’s fo-
cus on the length of detention misses the point.  The majority noted that the 
statute is not silent as to the length of detention because it states detention is 
only required until removal proceedings conclude.  The issue, however, is 
not about the length of detention; the issue is about prolonged detention with-
out bond.  When prolonged detention is coupled with the impossibility of 
bond, then issues of constitutionality arise. So, while § 1226(c) specifies the 
length of detention, it is ambiguous as to the length of detention without bond.  
Finally, all federal courts before Jennings interpreted § 1226(c) as requiring 
a time limit to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation, yet the Court declined 
to consider whether its interpretation raises constitutional concerns.  For 
these reasons, the majority’s decision in Jennings was incorrectly decided, 
and § 1226(c) should be interpreted as containing a time limit to detention 
without bond to avoid violating the due process rights of detained nonciti-
zens.   
III. PROPOSAL FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION FOR NONCITIZENS WITH 
STRONG EQUITIES 
  Unlike the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings, the bright-line and 
case-by-case approaches adopted by the circuit courts pre-Jennings are a step 
in the right direction for protecting the rights of 1226(c)’s detained nonciti-
zens.  However, these approaches still fall short in striking the right balance 
between the due process rights and liberty interests of detained noncitizens 
against the security interests of the government.   
A. STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 
The case-by-case and bright-line approaches do not properly protect de-
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tainees’ liberty and due process interests because both approaches categori-
cally presume “that an alien’s detention for the first six months is reasonable 
and justified.”197  For example, the bright-line approach only requires peri-
odic bond hearings after six months of detention.  The case-by-case approach 
permits detainees to file a habeas petition at any time during their detention, 
but detention for less than six months is a strong mitigating factor against 
granting the petition.198  
The weight these approaches place on this presumption is misplaced.  
Due process requires mandatory detention to be reasonably related to the 
government’s purported immigration purpose of preventing flight and pro-
tecting public safety.199  Without a compelling governmental interest in con-
tinued detention, mandatory detention without bond does not overcome a 
noncitizen’s constitutional liberty interests.200   
For many detained noncitizens, there is no compelling governmental in-
terest in detention.  The stories highlighted by the Community Initiative for 
Visiting Aliens in Confinement (CIVIC) demonstrate that many noncitizens 
detained pursuant to § 1226(c) pose little threat to the community and are not 
a flight risk at any point during their mandatory detention sentence.201  These 
individuals are likely to be granted release on bond and are likely to win their 
cases to remain in the United States.202  Yet, under the current approaches, 
these noncitizens are detained and precluded from a bond determination for 
at least six months.  The presumptively reasonable six-month period under 
the bright-line and case-by-case approaches thus improperly balances the de-
tainee’s due process interests against the government’s interest in protecting 
the public and preventing flight.  
Empirical evidence also demonstrates that many noncitizens are neither 
a danger to the community or a flight risk.  For example, in a study that con-
trasted criminal pretrial detention with civil pre-removal order immigration 
detention, findings showed that detained noncitizens are less of a flight and 
 
197  Firemacion, supra note 116,  at 621. 
 198  Id.; see also Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1217 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting 
that under the case-by-case approach, “there is little chance that a criminal alien’s detention is 
unreasonable until at least the six-month mark”). 
199  See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531–32 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)). 
200  See id. (noting that “[l]iberty under the Due Process Clause includes protection against 
unlawful or arbitrary personal restraint or detention” (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 
718 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
201 See The Brief, supra note 1. 
202 Id. 
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public safety risk than detained criminals.203  Detained noncitizens are less 
likely to commit crimes than native-born citizens,204 and there are lower re-
cidivism rates found for noncitizens than criminal detainees.205  Furthermore, 
“criminal empirical researchers . . . found no evidence that lack of U.S. citi-
zenship increases flight risk.”206   Releasing noncitizens with strong equities, 
therefore, does not frustrate the government’s interest in preventing danger-
ousness and flight because many of these detainees have no interest in further 
engaging in criminal activity or failing to appear to their removal proceed-
ings. 
Detained noncitizens, on the other hand, pay a significant price.  Noncit-
izens are treated worse than citizens accused of a serious crime.  In our crim-
inal justice system, criminal defendants are presumed innocent until proven 
guilty and are constitutionally entitled to receive bail at a reasonable time 
after being detained.207 “Most studies show that criminal judges release a ma-
jority of defendants pretrial . . . even including defendants with more serious 
charges.”208  Noncitizens detained under § 1226(c), however, are not entitled 
to bond for at least six months because of the presumption that detention for 
six months is reasonable, irrespective of whether they are a flight risk or a 
danger to the community.209  
Mandatory detention also significantly harms detainees and their fami-
lies.210  Detained noncitizens are separated from their families, subjected to 
limited visitation and communication with them,211 and placed in detention 
 
203  NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH & JOSH ROVNER, SENT’G PROJECT, IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC 
SAFETY 70–71 (Mar. 16, 2017), available at https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications 
/immigration-public-safety/. 
      204 Id. at 71. 
205  Id.  
206  Id. at 72. 
207  Id. 
208  Id. 
209  Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 45, 70 (2014). 
210  See The Brief, supra note 1 (“Immigration detention is, in theory, a civil procedure and 
not punitive incarceration.  In reality, it inflicts profound suffering on detained people and 
their families, as they recount below.”). 
211  Caitlin Patler & Tonya Maria Golash-Boza, The fiscal and human costs of immigrant 
detention and deportation in the United States, 11 SOCIOLOGY COMPASS 1, 3 (2017), available 
at https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12536 (“A recent study of 462 detained parents found that ac-
cess to child visitation was not equally distributed: Individuals detained in private facilities 
were less likely to receive visits from their children, and individuals with undocumented chil-
dren received relatively fewer visits from their children than those without undocumented 
children.”). 
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centers that are often located outside of their home state.212  In some cases, 
detained noncitizens’ children are forced into foster care because no other 
person is available to take care of them while their parent is detained.213  Oth-
ers lose their jobs, businesses, and homes, or their education is disrupted.214   
Furthermore, immigration detention facilities are essentially indistin-
guishable from prison and sometimes considered worse.215  Detained noncit-
izens are detained behind bars in a prison jumpsuit under the same conditions 
as people currently serving prison sentences for violent criminal offenses.216  
Many of these facilities are owned and run by private prison companies that 
have a reputation for having poor track records on prison conditions.217  Ac-
cording to a federal report, detained noncitizens are subject to inhumane 
treatment, given insufficient hygiene supplies and medical care, and provided 
potentially unsafe food.218  This report also found that detainees “were housed 
incorrectly based on their criminal history” and that staff prevented detainees 
from filing grievances and took part in mistreating detainees.219  Other 
sources demonstrate that detainees are also subjected to arbitrary solitary 
 
212  Id; see also The Brief, supra note 1. 
213  See The Brief, supra note 1 (detailing how Alexander Lora, the appellee in Lora v. 
Shanahan, had to place his son in foster care after he was detained). 
214  Id. (discussing how Sayid Omargharib lost his business while detained because he 
could not keep up with business expenses and his clientele left permanently to other business 
and he was unable to replace them); see also Patler & Golash-Boza, supra note 211, at 3 (not-
ing that a studied “revealed that detention contributed to extreme financial insecurity for the 
family members of detained individuals. Respondents had, on average, lived in the United 
States for 20 years, and 69% have a U.S. Citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident spouse or 
child. A full 94% reported being a source of financial or emotional support for their families 
prior to detention”). 
215   Patler & Golash-Boza, supra note 211, at 3. 
216  Id. 
217  The Brief, supra note 1. 
218  See generally OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONCERNS ABOUT 
ICE DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT DETENTION FACILITIES (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017-12/OIG-18-32-Dec17.pdf; see also 
Patler & Golash-Boza, supra note 211, at 3 (noting that “[s]erious allegations have emerged 
about life inside detention centers, including improper management and operation, particularly 
regarding the provision of preventative and emergency health care services and access to at-
torney visits”). 
219  OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 218. 
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confinement220  and sexual abuse by staff and other detainees.221 
In short, the current approaches adopted by the circuit courts do not 
properly protect detainees’ constitutional rights because both approaches lim-
iting detainees’ opportunity to challenge their continued detention, which 
raises the same “serious doubts” of constitutionality that Justice Breyer ar-
gued are raised when § 1226(c) is interpreted as forbidding an individualized 
bond hearing. 
B. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION FOR NONCITIZENS WITH STRONG 
EQUITIES 
Noncitizens that are detained pursuant to § 1226(c) should be given the 
opportunity to apply for prosecutorial discretion to defer action on their man-
datory detention.222 If granted, these noncitizens should be released, under 
supervision, if necessary, during the course of their removal proceedings.  If 
not granted, noncitizens should then be entitled to automatic and periodic 
bond hearing after six months of detention. 
1. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutorial discretion in immigration law “refers to the decision the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes,” as an agency of the exec-
utive branch, “about whether to enforce the immigration laws against a per-
son or a group of persons.”223  The concept of prosecutorial discretion applies 
in many contexts, including administrative, civil, and criminal contexts, and 
 
220  See generally NIJC & PHR, INVISIBLE IN ISOLATION: THE USE OF SEGREGATION AND 
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRANT DETENTION (2012), http://static.prisonpolicy.org/ 
scans/Invisible.pdf. 
221  Safia Samee Ali, Sexual Assaults in Immigration Detention Centers Rarely Get Inves-
tigated, Group Charges, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/sexual-assaults-immigration-detention-centers-don-t-get-investigated-says-n745616. 
222  The current administration’s enforcement priorities state that every deportable noncit-
izen is a priority.  See Exec. Order No. 13767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement 
Improvements, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13768, Enhancing 
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).  
The administration’s enforcement priorities, however, cannot feasibly identify, arrest, and de-
port all groups of noncitizens, especially since data shows that the U.S. is already over-capac-
ity in detention, and immigration courts are overwhelmingly backlogged.  The current admin-
istration’s immigration policy will inevitably tip towards some form of enforcement priority, 
and this Comment argues that noncitizens that are not a flight risk or a danger to the commu-
nity should exist outside the ambit of that priority.  
223  Shoba S. Wadhia, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 64 
AM. U. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2014). 
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may be used at any stage of an immigration case.224   
The legal authority for prosecutorial discretion can be found in the Take 
Care Clause of Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution.225  The 
Take Care Clause imposes a duty on the President to faithfully execute the 
laws that are established by the legislative branch.226  In Heckler v. Chaney, 
the Supreme Court made it clear that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute 
or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally 
committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”227   
A review of U.S. immigration laws implemented by Congress confirms 
that Congress has authorized DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion in re-
gards to the implementation of immigration policy.228  This is most evident 
in the Department of Homeland Security Act, which states that “[t]he Secre-
tary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and en-
forcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and 
naturalization of aliens.”229  A memorandum by former INS Commissioner 
Doris Meisnner, dated November 17, 2000, explains the broad application of 
prosecutorial discretion: 
In the immigration context, the term [prosecutorial discretion] applies not only to the 
decision to issue, serve, or file a Notice to Appear (NTA), but also to a broad range of 
other discretionary enforcement decisions, including among others: Focusing investi-
gative resources on particular offenses or conduct; deciding whom to stop, question, 
and arrest; maintaining an alien in custody; seeking expedited removal or other forms 
of removal by means other than a removal proceeding; settling or dismissing a proceed-
ing; granting deferred action or staying a final order; agreeing to voluntary departure, 
withdrawal of an application for admission, or other action in lieu of removing the alien; 
pursuing an appeal; and executing a removal order.230 
The purpose of prosecutorial discretion is both monetary and humani-
tarian.231  The government has limited resources to spend and therefore can-
not assert the full scope of its enforcement authority and instead needs to 
 
       224  Id. 
225  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
226  Id.  
227  470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
228  Wadhia, supra note 223, at 1296. 
229  8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1996). 
230  Shoba S. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. 
PUB. L.J. 243, 244–245 (2010); see also Marisa Bono, When a Rose is Not a Rose: DACA, the 
DREAM Act, and the Need for More Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 40 T. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 193, 203 (“Executive administrators have exercised their discretion to grant deferred 
action for two main purposes: first, to more efficiently allocate resources as a matter of ‘ad-
ministrative convenience;’ and second, to recognize humanitarian considerations when remov-
able would be unconscionable.”). 
231  Wadhia, supra note 230, at 244–245. 
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prioritize its focus.232  Furthermore, some individuals, because of their up-
standing reputation in society, are not pursued as a “reward for their good 
deeds and in part a judgment by society that some people are morally desira-
ble and more likely to succeed in the future.”233  Another factor that has 
prompted the use of prosecutorial discretion is the adoption of the IIRIRA in 
1996.  The 1996 IIRIRA changes to immigration policy, which, as described 
above, expanded the list of offenses that could qualify as aggravated felonies 
and adopted the mandatory detention of certain classes of noncitizens, “ren-
dered the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the INS the only means for 
averting the extreme hardship associated with certain deportation and/or re-
moval cases.”234  Instead, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a 
component of DHS that is primarily responsible for enforcing “federal laws 
governing border control, customs, trade and immigration,” looks to the ex-
ecutive’s priorities regarding immigration policy to determine which groups 
of noncitizens are an enforcement priority under the current administration.  
The most widely recognized form of prosecutorial discretion is deferred 
action, also called priority status.235  Put simply, “[d]eferred action is a more 
formal way of exercising prosecutorial discretion.”236  While there is no stat-
utory basis for deferred action,237 this type of prosecutorial discretion “ena-
bles the government to make a formal determination not to pursue removal 
of an unqualified or unlawfully present individual for a specific period of 
time, usually for extraordinary humanitarian or law enforcement pur-
poses.”238  
An example of deferred action is President Obama’s adoption of the De-
ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program in 2012.239  DACA 
 
232  Id. 
233  Id. at 245. 
234  Id. at 253 (citing a letter written by Attorney General Robert Raben to Massachusetts 
Congressmen Barney Frank). 
235  Id. at 246. 
236  Jessica Vaughan, What is Deferred Action?, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (June 15, 2012), 
https://cis.org/Vaughan/What-Deferred-Action.  
237  The Code of Federal Regulations describes deferred action as “an act of administrative 
convenience to the government which gives some cases lower priority.”  See 8 C.F.R. 
§274a.12(c)(14).  
238  Id. 
239  See Remarks by the President on Immigration, WHITE HOUSE (June 15, 2012, 2:30 
PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-
immigration.  It is important to note that on September 5, 2017, the Acting Secretary of Home-
land Security rescinded the June 12, 2012 memorandum establishing the DACA program.  See 
Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) from Elaine 
C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, to James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizen and Immigration 
Services, Et Al. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memo 
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put forth a deferred action initiative by which unauthorized youth who grew 
up in the United States and had other strong equities were eligible for a stay 
of deportation.”240  President Obama’s focus “on humanitarian factors like 
family relationships resembles how prosecutorial discretion, and deferred ac-
tion in particular, has been applied historically.”241  Thus, in adopting DACA, 
the Obama administration took major strides in broadening the protection of 
noncitizens when they announced their decision to defer the deportation of 
millions of noncitizens.242   
It is important to note that prosecutorial discretion, including deferred 
action, is not a new idea in the United States’ immigration policy.243  In fact, 
prosecutorial discretion has played a major role in immigration enforcement 
throughout our country’s history.  For example,  
[o]ne of the earliest documents used by the immigration agency . . . was an Operations 
Instruction that allowed for ‘deferred action’ . . . for noncitizens who could show one 
or more of the following factors: advanced or tender age; presence in the United States 
for many years; need for treatment in the United States for a physical or mental condi-
tion; and adverse effect on family members in the United States as a result of deporta-
tion.” Furthermore, “by the time DACA came around, federal immigration agencies 
had been using deferred action with the Supreme Court’s blessing for over 60 years.244 
2. Prosecutorial Discretion for Detained Noncitizens  
Detained noncitizens should be given the opportunity to apply for pros-
ecutorial discretion immediately after being detained pursuant to § 1226(c).  
Prosecutorial discretion in the form of deferred action for detained nonciti-
zens with strong equities is the type of enforcement priority that is consistent 
with humanitarian and monetary theories of prosecutorial discretion and is 
consistent with the use of prosecutorial discretion since the enactment of 
IIRIRA. 
First, there are many detained noncitizens who have compelling human-
itarian factors.  The Second Circuit in Lora explained that there are two types 
 
randum-rescission-daca. 
240  See generally Memorandum on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of 
Homeland Security on DACA to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border 
Prot., Et Al. (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. 
241  See Wadhia, supra note 223, at 1301–02. 
242  See Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration, WHITE 
HOUSE (Nov. 20, 2014, 8:01 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/ 
remarks-president-address-nation-immigration.  
243  See Wadhia, supra note 223, at 1293. 
244  Bono, supra note 230, at 204.  
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of noncitizens that § 1226(c) subjects to mandatory detention: (1) noncitizens 
that “have criminal records. . . are dangerous[,] or have no ties to a commu-
nity, and (2) “non-citizens who, for a variety of individualized reasons, are 
not dangerous, have strong family and community ties, are not flight risks[,] 
and may have meritorious defenses to deportation at such time as they are 
able to present them.”245  Detainees in the latter category are not a danger to 
society or a flight risk.246  Most of these detainees have not even committed 
serious or violent offenses.  Rather, most were detained for committing mi-
nor, nonviolent offenses but were subject to mandatory detention because of 
the series of immigration enforcement policy changes made by the enactment 
of the IIRIRA.247  Further, these detainees are generally upstanding members 
of their communities who contribute to the economy and pay taxes.248  De-
tainees in this latter category are also likely to have meritorious defenses 
against their continued detention if given the opportunity to present them, 
which in turn makes it more that they will to return to defend their case.249  
Second, there are compelling monetary reasons to provide prosecutorial 
discretion to detained noncitizens with strong equities.  The cost of detaining 
noncitizens is very high,250 and reducing the number of detainees will allow 
the government to spend more money on improving detention centers that 
are in need of resources.251  This, in turn, will save taxpayers money and al-
low the government to focus on more serious crimes.252  Furthermore, the 
costs of detention go far beyond what the government spends in detention 
centers.  A recent study that surveyed over 500 detained noncitizens who had 
been detained for six months or more “found that long-­‐term detention re-
moved millions of dollars from local communities.”253  Approximately 90% 
of the surveyed detainees were employed before being detained and had 
 
245    Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2015). 
246  See supra Section III.A. 
247  See supra Section I.B. 
248  See supra Section I.B. 
249   See supra Section I.B. 
250  Immigration Detention: How Can the Government Cut Costs?, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Mar. 
31, 2013), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uploads/pdfs/immigration-detention-fact-sheet-
jan-2013.pdf (describing that immigrant detention is costing taxpayers millions—in 2013 
alone “the federal government spen[t] more than $5 million daily to detain immigrants). 
251  See generally OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 218. 
252  Wadhia, supra note 230, at 268 (“Like all law enforcement agencies, the INS has finite 
resources, and it is not possible to investigate and prosecute all immigration violations . . . the 
Service must make decisions about how best to expend its resources.  Managers should plan 
and design operations to maximize the likelihood that serious offenders will be identified.”).  
253  Patler & Golash-Boza, supra note 211, at 3–4. 
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steady pre-detention earnings.254  Based on these earnings, the study found 
that “the estimated lost wages for the sample due to detention was $43,357 
per day.”255 
3.  Application and Risk Assessment Tools 
Similar to other warrants for prosecutorial discretion, the application 
would be sent to a local ICE office and reviewed by ICE officers to determine 
if the positive factors in a noncitizen’s background make him or her a nonpri-
ority for detention.  If a noncitizen is granted prosecutorial discretion, the 
detainee is released for the duration of their removal proceedings.  
Officers that review applications for deferred action can use current risk 
assessment tools to objectively determine whether an applicant should be 
granted deferred action on their continued detention.  For example, “the Of-
fice of Probation and Pretrial Services of the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts has developed a risk assessment tool designed specifically for 
federal pretrial defendants.”256  By using the Risk Prediction Index (RPI), 
officers will be exposed to “valuable information for determining whether or 
not an individual should be incarcerated until the trial or released, and if the 
latter, whether the [noncitizen] should be required to post bond or be subject 
to an alternative to detention.”257  This risk tool is particularly useful because 
while it “incorporates information such as criminal history, demographics, 
drug use, and residency, it intentionally does not give significant considera-
tion to immigration status.”258  
Furthermore, current Alternatives to Detention (ATD) programs can be 
used to ensure that detention is a last resort.259  ICE has in place several ATD 
programs, such as release on parole, check-in at ICE offices, home visits and 
check-ins, telephonic monitoring, and in rare cases, GPS monitoring through 
an electronic ankle bracelet.260  Prosecutorial discretion in conjunction with 
the use of ATD programs protects both the detainee’s liberty interest and the 
 
254  Id. 
255  Id. at 4. 
256  See generally Allyson Theophile, Pretrial Risk Assessment and Immigration Status: A 




257  Id. 
258  Id. 
259  Alternatives to Detention, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, https://www.detention 
watchnetwork.org/issues/alternatives (last visited May 17, 2018). 
260  Id. 
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government’s interest in preventing flight and dangerousness.  
There are many things that assuredly could go wrong with this proposal.  
For instance, there is no way of ensuring that applicants are given the needed 
assistance and resources to apply for release while detained, especially when 
detention centers are presently having a difficult time providing detainees 
with proper basic needs.  To address this problem and other similar problems, 
ICE should ensure that the application is available online, in hard copy at all 
detention centers, and in multiple languages.  Furthermore, ICE should be 
required to provide detained noncitizens with information on how to apply 
online as well as telephonic assistance and detailed instructions on paper hard 
copies.  All immigration detention centers should be informed that no de-
tained noncitizen can be denied the liberty to apply.  Finally, applicants 
should also be afforded the opportunity to appeal a determination by ICE to 
an independent board consisting of ICE officers located in another office. 
Another problem that might arise from this proposal is the reality that 
the current culture at ICE under today’s administration is one that is aggres-
sive and unapologetic to noncitizens that violate immigration laws.261  ICE 
officers might therefore abuse their discretion and deny prosecutorial discre-
tion even to detained noncitizen that clearly qualify.  To address this problem, 
ICE officials should be required to attend training on how to use the risk 
assessment tool in an objective manner.  The training should be developed in 
collaboration with nongovernmental organizations that are knowledgeable 
about the effect mandatory detention has had on detainees and their families.  
All officers should be required to make a decision within seventy-two hours 
so as not to delay release.  Also, adopting prosecutorial discretion for de-
tained noncitizens can potentially shift the aggressive ICE culture that exists 
under the current administration by exposing ICE officials to the positive 
characteristics of detained noncitizens. 
4. Six-Month Bond Hearing if Discretion is Denied 
In the case that a detained noncitizen is denied prosecutorial discretion, 
automatic periodic bond hearings beginning at six months should be required.  
Six-month detention without bond at this point will no longer be unreasona-
ble because detained noncitizens would have had the opportunity to apply for 
prosecutorial discretion. Furthermore, requiring automatic bond hearings will 
ensure that every detained noncitizen is given their day in court in the event 
that their application for prosecutorial discretion is not granted. 
 
261 John Burnett, Riding With ICE: ‘We Are Trying To Do The Right Thing,’ NPR (June 20, 
2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/07/20/537894936/ice-not-apologizing-for-aggressive-tac-
tics.  
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CONCLUSION 
Due to the current political climate regarding immigration law, the due 
process rights of noncitizens have never been in such great jeopardy.  This 
risk is even more concerning for noncitizens who have committed a § 1226(c) 
qualifying offense and are mandatorily detained. Due process is a right af-
forded to everyone, regardless of a person’s immigration status or previous 
criminal record.  Detained noncitizens are no exception to these rights, and 
mandatory detention under § 1226(c), without any opportunity for bond dur-
ing detention, is a violation of detained noncitizens’ constitutional rights to 
liberty and due process.  The circuit courts aptly read § 1226(c) to include a 
time limitation against unreasonably prolonged detention.  The approaches 
adopted by these courts, however, incorrectly presumed that detention for at 
least six months is reasonable and justified. As this Comment has shown, 
detention for even six months is not reasonable or justified for many detained 
noncitizens who have strong equities and can prove they are not dangerous 
or a flight risk. As an alternative, this Comment proposed that detained 
noncitizens should be afforded the opportunity to apply for prosecutorial dis-
cretion as to their continued detention at any point after being detained.  If 
granted, detained noncitizens are released for the duration of their removal 
proceedings, and if denied, detained noncitizens are entitled to automatic and 
periodic bond hearings after six months.  
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